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Abstract 
Purpose – Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high 
due to the nature of perishable products. This paper aims to maximize profit through 
the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the 
supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived.  
Design/methodology/approach – To address this issue, we consider a two-echelon 
supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e., wholesaler) for two scenarios: 
centralized and decentralized decision-making. We start from investigating the 
optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with 
those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract 
and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical 
examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at end. 
Findings – The results show that (a) the centralized decision is more profitable than 
the decentralized decision; (b) a fresh product supply chain can only be coordinated 
through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; (c) the optimal retail price, 
wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; (d) the profit of a fresh 
product supply chain is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and 
negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price.  
Originality/value – Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision 
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variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the 
fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In 
particular, fresh-keeping cost sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are 
examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem. 
Keywords Fresh product; Supply chain; Contract; Coordination; Fresh-keeping effort 
Paper type Research paper 
 
1 Introduction 
One of biggest challenges in fresh product supply chain (FPSC) is maintaining 
product freshness. According to Cai et al. (2010), in developed countries, there is up 
to a 15% loss of product due to damage and spoilage. In developing countries, this 
loss rate is much higher. Overcoming this problem requires retailers and suppliers to 
work closely by coordinating operations across the supply chain. FPSC retailers and 
suppliers are severely affected by consumer value and product freshness and price; 
these considerations could invalidate such companies’ original coordination schemes 
in cases lacking a contract. Therefore, research on the issue of coordinating FPSC 
management through contract is both meaningful and critical. 
There have been numerous research on FPSC. The majority of research has focused 
on inventory management, pricing and ordering strategies. Dye (2007) developed a 
time-varying deterioration rate to formulate an inventory model for perishable 
products by assuming a constant loss rate for fresh products. Lodree and Uzochukwu 
(2008) investigated the inventory management of fresh products by assuming that 
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consumer demand changes with the product deterioration rate. Ferguson and 
Koenigsberg (2007) studied a two-period model in which inventory is left over from 
the first period and a firm must decide whether to carry all, some or none of the 
leftover inventory to the next period. Such decisions affect reactions to new product 
production and pricing strategies. Cachon and Kök (2007) re-examined the 
newsvendor problem by assessing the product salvage value and then making optimal 
decisions on order quantity. Akcay et al. (2010) investigated the optimal joint 
dynamic pricing of various perishable products when considering strategic consumers 
using an algorithm of multinomial time. Wang and Li (2012) argued that, although it 
is difficult to forecast the quality of perishable products, it is possible to develop a 
pricing method to maximize profit based on more exact quality information. Gallego 
and Hu (2014) presented a joint pricing approach for competitive products in a special 
market environment, with perishable products consisting of substitutable and 
complementary products. Nakandala et al. (2016) developed an optimization model 
for considering quality and transportation and determined optimal pricing decisions to 
minimize total cost for fresh food. Halim et al. (2008) introduced the ordering strategy 
of stochastic demand in cases of product shortage using a fuzzy number deterioration 
rate. In these studies, inventory management and pricing and ordering strategies were 
studied separately.  
Some researches have considered the three factors in combination. Li et al. (2009) 
studied the optimal levels of pricing and inventory simultaneously for perishable 
products, developing an optimal inventory replenishment strategy to reduce loss. 
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Kanchanasuntorn and Techanitisawad (2006) developed an inventory model for 
perishable products with fixed life cycles, examining how product perishability and 
stockout influence supply chain profit, cost, service and inventory. Pasternack (2008) 
presented a hierarchical model to determine optimal pricing strategies and return 
policies for perishable products with short shelf or demand lives. Dong et al. (2009) 
determined optimal decisions for inventory and pricing when considering strategic 
consumers using a polynomial model. Herbon et al. (2014) examined a replenishment 
policy in regular time for perishable products and developed a dynamic pricing 
strategy to attract more consumers and generate greater profit. Chen et al. (2014) 
analysed the issue of joint pricing and inventory control for perishable products with 
fixed lifetimes over a finite horizon. Li et al. (2015) considered strategies of inventory 
control and joint dynamic pricing for perishable products in a stochastic inventory 
system. Chew et al. (2014) investigated optimal decision making for perishable 
products with multiple-cycle lifetimes, including decisions regarding price and order 
quantity. Avinadav et al. (2013) developed an optimization model for considering 
time-dependent and price-dependent demand and determined optimal order quantities, 
pricing decisions and replenishment periods for perishable products. Sainathan (2013) 
considered perishable products with two-period shelf lives in an infinite horizon and 
derived optimal pricing decisions and ordering strategies. None of these studies 
considered ways to coordinate FPSC with a contract. 
The literature on FPSC contract coordination is very sparse. Most studies have 
focused on non-perishable products. Feng and Lu (2013) studied a two-echelon 
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supply chain consisting of retailers and manufacturers and analysed contracting 
behaviours in different competitive scenarios. Xu et al. (2014) investigated how the 
risk aversion of dual-channel supply chain partners influences the coordination of 
contracts using a mean-variance mathematical model. Sommer and Loch (2009) 
suggested that employee effort can be motivated by incentive contracts in cases of 
unpredictable events. Xiao et al. (2011) examined how to coordinate the supply chain 
which contains a manufacturer and a retailer by revenue-sharing contract, proposed a 
product quality assurance policy, and consumer’s utility is used in the model. 
Krishnan et al. (2004) investigated the effects of retailer promotional effort on 
consumer demand and develop a contract for channel coordination through 
consideration of this promotional effort. Shang and Yang (2015) investigated the 
choice of profit-sharing coefficient and the distribution of increased profit when the 
dual-channel supply chain is coordinated by profit-sharing contract, and risk 
preference and negotiation ability had an effect on the two factors. Jiang and Chen 
(2016) presented a newsvendor model to coordinate the supply chain, and 
characterized expectations equilibrium to obtain the optimal solutions when 
considering consumer’s strategic behaviour. Lee et al., (2014) proposed procurement 
strategies and derived optimal procurement quantity so as to maximize firm’s profit 
by forward contract, and finally realized the coordination of supply chain. Cachon and 
Lariviere (2005) developed a newsvendor model for one supplier and one retailer 
using a revenue-sharing contract and compared the profits generated by this contract 
to profits generated by other contracts in one period. He and Zhao (2012) investigated 
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the coordination of multi-tier supply chains when supply and demand are not definite, 
showing that supply chains can be coordinated through wholesale price contracts with 
return strategies. Lau et al. (2008) suggested that purchase contracts are designed to 
coordinate supply chains when considering price-sensitive demand, thus allowing the 
dominant retailer to generate greater profit. Chen and Bell (2011) examined supply 
chain coordination with buy-back contracts using fixed percentages of consumer 
returns. Sana and Chaudhuri (2008) analysed how to coordinate supply chains to 
maximize profit using credit and price-discount contracts when considering 
time-dependent demands. Ma et al. (2013) discussed the issue of channel coordination 
in a two-tier supply chain, proposing an innovative supply chain contract to induce 
effort on the parts of both the retailer and the manufacturer. Xiao et al. (2010) 
coordinated a supply chain using a buyback contract and a markdown money contract, 
respectively, under a partial refund policy. Furthermore, they analysed how changes 
to some model parameters affected supply chain profit. However, their models did not 
consider the characteristics of fresh products.  
A few studies have examined the coordination of FPSC in consideration of product 
loss rates. Ketzenberg and Ferguson (2008) investigated the value of information 
sharing between retailers and suppliers for perishable products, considering the effects 
of information sharing on deterioration and demand for supply chain coordination. 
Blackburn and Scudder (2009) presented a combined strategy involving mixed 
product speed and efficiency for perishable products to coordinate FPSC. Rong et al. 
(2011) modelled the production and distribution of perishable food items and studied 
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their quality and cost in a supply chain with mixed-integer linear programming. Cai et 
al. (2013) designed an incentive scheme to coordinate the FPSC, examining whether 
the incentive contract could remove the “double marginalization” that exists in supply 
chains and encourage partners to act in a coordinated way. Wang and Webster 
(2009) showed that percent markdown money contracts and quantity markdown 
money contracts can coordinate the supply chains for perishable goods with clearance 
pricing. However, the extant literature has not yet simultaneously examined 
fresh-keeping cost sharing contracts and revenue-sharing contracts in the study of the 
FPSC coordination problem.  
From the above review, it suggests: first, the food supply chain is a relative less 
studied area; second, taking freshness of the food into consideration is rather scarce; 
third, simultaneously examining fresh-keeping cost and revenue issues is rare. This 
motives our research in developing a model by taking these two tactics, i.e. 
fresh-keeping cost sharing and revenue-sharing, into consideration. 
This paper examines the coordination of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a 
retailer and a supplier by considering fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the 
modelling of supply chain. In this research, the supplier refers to the wholesaler. We 
present a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in 
centralized and decentralized FPSC, respectively; provide optimal solutions for both 
supplier and retailer, including with respect to retail price, wholesale price and 
fresh-keeping effort; and analyse the impacts of consumer sensitivities to price and 
freshness on FPSC profit. We investigate how FPSC coordination and a win-win 
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outcome can be achieved through cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts between 
retailer and supplier. We also derive the optimal cost-sharing and revenue-sharing 
coefficients to realize a win-win result. Figure 1 demonstrates the research framework 
for a FPSC. 
Inset: Figure 1 Research Framework for a FPSC 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and 
assumptions. Section 3 studies a centralized and a decentralized coordination model 
for a FPSC coordinated without a contract. Section 4 investigates two types of 
contracts for coordinating between the retailer and the supplier: a fresh-keeping cost 
sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract. Section 5 
uses some numerical examples to illustrate the model. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Model description 
We consider a FPSC consisting of one supplier and one retailer. It costs c  per unit 
for the supplier to procure the product. The supplier then sells the product to the 
retailer at a wholesale pricew , and the retailer sells the product to consumers at a 
retail price p . We use a continuous variable τ  to measure the level of effort (Cai et 
al., 2010) used by the retailer to preserve the fresh product. This effort is called the 
fresh-keeping effort. The relationships of events in FPSC are presented in Figure 2. 
Insert: Figure 2 Relationships of Events under Consideration 
Let θ  denotes a freshness index in the range of [0,1], with θ =1 and θ =0 
representing a “fully fresh” and “completely decayed” product, respectively. We adopt 
the freshness index function developed by Avinadav et al. (2013): 
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2
1
0 )()(
T
t
t ηθθ −= , [ ]Tt ,0∈                     (1)
                 
where T  is the sale period of the fresh product; 0θ  is the initial value of freshness; 
and η
 
is the product’s perishability rate. From Eq. (1), we know that if the 
perishability rate η  increases, the product freshness will decrease sharply at the end 
of the sale period. 
Furthermore, η  is a function of τ , as follows: 0=(1 )kη τ η−  (Dan et al., 2012), 
where k  is the coefficient of τ , and (0,1)k∈ , (0,1)τ ∈ . 
A fresh-keeping effort implies a certain cost, which is denoted as ( )c τ . According 
to Ma et al. (2013), we assume that the fresh-keeping cost function is 2
1
( )
2
c mτ τ= , 
where m is the fresh-keeping cost coefficient. 
The assumptions in the model are: 
(1)  Order quantity of retailer and supplier is equal to the demand (Ma et al., 
2013a; Xiao and Xu, 2013; Zhang et al., 2012).   
(2)  In a sale period T , the consumer arrival rate δ  at any time is constant. 
(3) In any cycle, the lead time is negligible, and shortages are not allowed. 
(4)  The retailer and supplier are risk-neutral, therefore they always purse the 
maximum profit. 
Similar to Xu et al. (2012), we assume that the utility faced by the consumer is a 
linear function of retail price and freshness of product. The utility function of fresh 
product is given as: 
                          0
( ) ( )U t U p tα βθ= − +
             
(2) 
where 0U represents the initial value of the fresh product and follows a uniform 
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distribution of [0,1] , α denotes consumers’ sensitivity to the product price and β
denotes consumers’ sensitivity to the product freshness. 
The following notation is used in the model: 
c : supplier’s procurement cost per unit of fresh product; 
cQ : retailer’s ordering quantity in the centralized FPSC; 
cp : retail price of the fresh product in the centralized FPSC; 
cπ : total profit in the centralized FPSC; 
iw : wholesale price of the supplier in the decentralized FPSC; 
dQ : retailer’s ordering quantity in the decentralized FPSC; 
dp : retail price in the decentralized FPSC; 
riπ : retailer profit in the decentralized FPSC; 
siπ : supplier profit in the decentralized FPSC; 
iπ : total profit in the decentralized FPSC; 
i : 1i =  without a contract; 2i =  for a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract; 3i =  
for a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract. 
3 A coordination model without contract 
In this section, we examine the optimal decisions for retail price and fresh-keeping 
effort in a centralized and a decentralized FPSC without contract. 
3.1 Decisions in centralized FPSC 
In the centralized FPSC, the supplier and retailer are treated as one entity. They 
make optimal decisions to maximize their total profit. 
From a consumer point of view, the decision to purchase a fresh product is based 
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on the expectation of a positive utility function i.e. ( ) 0U t > ; otherwise, the consumer 
will walk away. Therefore, the market demand of a fresh product at any time t  is 
( ) ( 0)tD t P Uδ= > . ( 0)tP U >  is the probability when consumers’ utility function is 
positive. Substituting Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) into the market demand function, we obtain: 
1
2
0 0
1 1
2 2
0 0 0
( ) ( ( ( ) ) 0)
= ( ( ( ) )) (1 ( ( ) ))
c
c c
t
D t P U p
T
t t
P U p p
T T
δ α β θ η
δ α β θ η δ α β θ η
= − + − >
> − − = − + −
          
(3) 
Eq. (3) represents the whole market demand in the FPSC at any time. Therefore, in 
a sale period T , the actual ordering quantity of fresh product is: 
                 
1
2
0
0 0
= ( ) (1 ( ( ) ))
T T
c c
t
Q D t p dt
T
δ α β θ η= − + −∫ ∫
                 
(4) 
Then, the total profit function cπ  in the centralized FPSC is given by: 
                 
1
22
0
0
[( ) ( )] ( )
1
( ) (1 ( ( ) ))
2
c c c
T
c c
p w w c Q c
t
p c p dt m
T
π τ
δ α β θ η τ
= − + − −
= − − + − −∫
             
(5) 
In Eq. (5), we notice that wholesale price w  disappears in the centralized FPSC.  
We seek to determine the optimal decisions for the price cp  and the fresh-keeping 
effort τ  to coordinate the supply chain. 
Theorem 1 In the centralized FPSC, for any given parameters 
0( )kα β η， ， ， , the 
optimal retail price of a fresh product is 1 2
2
3 (3 ) 4
2(9 2 )
c
m c B B c
p
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
 and the optimal 
fresh-keeping effort of the fresh product is 0 1
2
( 3 )
9 2
c
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
, where 
1 0 03(1 ) 2B βθ βη= + − , 
2 2 2
2 0=B T kδ β η . 
Proof. 
Page 11 of 40 Industrial Management & Data Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Industrial Management & Data Systems
To find the optimal retail price and fresh-keeping effort to maximize cπ , we 
differentiate cπ  with respect to cp  and cτ , setting both them equal to 0. Solving 
0c
cp
π∂
=
∂
 and 0c
c
π
τ
∂
=
∂
, we find that the optimal retail price is
1 2
2
3 (3 ) 4
2(9 2 )
c
m c B B c
p
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
and the optimal fresh-keeping effort is 
0 1
2
( 3 )
9 2
c
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
. 
However, to ensure that the first order derivation is the optimal result, we need to 
prove that the function is concave. The Hessian matrix is 
2 2
0
2
2 2
0
2
2
2
3
=
2
3
c c
c c c
c c
c c c
T k
T
p p
H
T k
m
p
π π η β δ
αδτ
η β δπ π
τ τ
 ∂ ∂  −   ∂ ∂ ∂  =  
 ∂ ∂  −    ∂ ∂ ∂  
. This shows that the Hessian matrix 
of cπ  is a negative definite for all values of cp  and cτ  if 
2022 ( ) 0
3
T k
Tm
η β δ
αδ − > . Therefore, total profit cπ  is concave to cp  and cτ . 
Hence, theorem 1 holds. 
Substituting cp  and cτ  into Eq. (5), we obtain the optimal total profit in 
centralized FPSC as follows: 
                             
2
1
2
( 3 )
4(9 2 )
c
Tm B c
m B
δ α
π
α
∗ −=
−
                          
(6) 
Since 20
2
2 ( ) 0
3
T k
Tm
η β δ
αδ − > , we can obtain 2
09 2 ( ) 0m T kα δ η β− > , which is 
29 2 0m Bα − > . Therefore, the optimal total profit is positive.  
Note that 
29 2 0m Bα − >  is considered in the rest paper. In addition, the optimal 
fresh-keeping effort (0,1)cτ
∗ ∈ ; thus, we can derive that 21
0
9 2
0 3
m B
B c
T k
α
α
δβ η
−
< − < . 
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3.2 Decisions in decentralized FPSC 
In this subsection, we consider a decentralized supply chain in which the retailer 
and supplier make their decisions independently. This section aims to determine the 
optimal retail price, the optimal fresh-keeping effort and the optimal wholesale price 
to maximize expected individual profit. 
3.2.1 Optimal decisions of the fresh product retailer 
In the decentralized FPSC, the retailer makes optimal decisions according to the 
wholesale price 1w , which is given by the supplier. The retailer’s process of deducing 
its market demand function and ordering quantity function is similar to that in the 
centralized supply chain. Thus, the profit function of a fresh product retailer is: 
              
1 1
1
22
1 0 0
0
( ) ( )
1
=( ) (1 ( (1 ) ( ) ))
2
r d d
T
d d
p w Q c
t
p w p k dt m
T
π τ
δ α β θ τ η τ
= − −
− − + − − −∫
        
(7) 
From Eq. (7), we can obtain the optimal retail price and the optimal fresh-keeping 
effort. 
Lemma 1 In the decentralized FPSC, for any given supplier’s wholesale price 1w , the 
optimal retail price is 1 1 2 1
1
2
3 (3 ) 4
( )
2(9 2 )
d
m w B B w
p w
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
and the optimal fresh-keeping 
effort is 0 1 1
1
2
( 3 )
( )
9 2
d
T k B w
w
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
. 
Proof. 
As in the proof of Theorem 1, to find the optimal retail price and the optimal 
fresh-keeping effort to maximize 1rπ , we differentiate 1rπ  with respect to dp  and 
dτ , respectively, setting these equal to 0.  
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The Hessian matrix is
0
0
2
2
3
2
3
T k
T
H
T k
m
η β δ
αδ
η β δ
 − 
=  
 −  
. This shows that the Hessian 
matrix of 1rπ  returns a negative definite for all values of dp  and dτ  if 
2022 ( ) 0
3
T k
Tm
η β δ
αδ − > . Therefore, we find that the optimal retail price is
0 1 0
3( 1) 2 (1 )
( )
6
d
d d
w k
p
βθ α βη τ
τ
α
∗ + + − −=
 
and the optimal fresh-keeping effort is 
1 02( )( )
3
d
d d
p w T k
p
m
βη δ
τ ∗
−
= . Simultaneously, from the two equations, we can obtain 
1 1 2 1
1
2
3 (3 ) 4
( )
2(9 2 )
d
m w B B w
p w
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
 and 0 1 1
1
2
( 3 )
( )
9 2
d
T k B w
w
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
. 
Lemma 1 shows that the optimal retail price and the optimal fresh-keeping effort 
are functions of the supplier’s wholesale price 1w . The supplier determines its 
optimal wholesale price according to the retailer’s reaction function. 
3.2.2 Optimal decisions of the fresh product supplier 
For any given wholesale price 1w  of a fresh product supplier, the retailer has a 
corresponded ordering quantity. The profit function of a fresh product supplier is: 
                  
1 1
1
2
1 0 0
0
( )
( ) (1 ( (1 ) ( ) ))
s d
T
d d
w c Q
t
w c p k dt
T
π
δ α β θ τ η
= −
= − − + − −∫
           
(8) 
Substituting 
1( )dp w
∗  and 
1( )d wτ
∗  into Eq. (8), we obtain the optimal supplier 
profit in the decentralized FPSC. The profit function has only one decision variable: 
1w . 
Lemma 2 In the decentralized FPSC, the optimal wholesale price of a fresh product 
supplier is 1 2
1
2
3 ( 3 ) 2
2(9 )
m B c B c
w
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
. 
Proof. 
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  Taking the first derivative of Eq. (8) with respect to wholesale price 1w , we set it 
equal to 0. Taking the second derivative of Eq. (8) with respect to 1w , we have 
2
1
2
1
0s T
w
π
δα
∂
= − <
∂
, which is the fresh product supplier’s profit function 1sπ  and 
which is concave to 1w . Therefore, we find that the optimal wholesale price is 
1 2
1
2
3 ( 3 ) 2
2(9 )
m B c B c
w
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
. 
Lemma 2 gives an optimal wholesale price 
1w
∗ . By substituting 
1w
∗  into Lemma 1, 
we can obtain the optimal retail price and the optimal fresh-keeping effort. 
Theorem 2 In the decentralized FPSC, the optimal retail price of the fresh product is 
1 2
2
9 ( 3 ) 4
4(9 )
d
m B c B c
p
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
 and the optimal fresh-keeping effort of fresh product is 
0 1 1
2
( 3 )
2(9 )
d
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
. 
Proof. 
Substituting the optimal wholesale price of the fresh product supplier 
1 2
1
2
3 ( 3 ) 2
2(9 )
m B c B c
w
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
 into 
1( )dp w
∗  and 
1( )d wτ
∗ , we obtain 
1 2
2
9 ( 3 ) 4
4(9 )
d
m B c B c
p
m B
α
α
∗ + +=
−
 and 0 1
2
( 3 )
2(9 )
d
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
. 
Substituting 
dp
∗ , 
dτ
∗
 
and
 1
w∗
 
into (7) and (8), we obtain the retailer’s optimal 
profit and the supplier’s optimal profit in the decentralized FPSC: 
                      
2
2 1
1 2
2
(9 2 )( 3 )
16(9 )
r
Tm m B B c
m B
δ α α
π
α
∗ − −=
−
                      
(9) 
                         
2 2
1
1 2
2
9 ( 3 )
8(9 )
s
Tm B c
m B
δα α
π
α
∗ −=
−
                         
 (10) 
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Because 29 2 0m Bα − > , as given previously, we know that
2 2 2
2 0 1= 0B T kδ β η > . 
Hence, 29 0m Bα − > ; therefore, 0dp
∗ > . Similarly, the optimal fresh-keeping effort 
(0,1)cτ
∗ ∈ , 0 1 1
2
( 3 )
2(9 )
d
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
α
∗ −=
−
; thus, we only consider the situation in which 
2 2
1
0 0
9 2 9
0 3
m B m B
B c
T k T k
α α
α
δβ η δβ η
− −
< − < < . 
3.2.3 Comparison of centralized and decentralized decisions 
In the above discussions, Theorem 1 provides the optimal retail price and the 
optimal fresh-keeping effort for a centralized FPSC, while Theorem 2 provides the 
optimal retail price and the optimal fresh-keeping effort for a decentralized FPSC. We 
can obtain Proposition 1 by contrasting the centralized supply chain and the 
decentralized supply chain with regard to optimal retail price, optimal fresh-keeping 
effort and total profit. 
Proposition 1 1）
d cτ τ
∗ ∗< ; 
          2）when 2 22 9 4B m Bα< < , d cp p∗ ∗< ; when 29 4m Bα > , d cp p∗ ∗> ; 
          3）
1 1r s cπ π π
∗ ∗ ∗+ < . 
Proof. 
1) 0 1 0 1
2 2
( 3 ) ( 3 )
2(9 ) 9 2
d c
T k B c T k B c
m B m B
δβ η α δβ η α
τ τ
α α
∗ ∗ − −− = −
− −
. Since the numerator is same, 
the denominator 2 2 22(9 ) 18 2 9 2m B m B m Bα α α− = − > − . Thus, we get 0d cτ τ
∗ ∗− < . 
Therefore,
 d c
τ τ∗ ∗< . 
2) 29 2 0m Bα − >  has been previously given. The retail price is positive; thus, 
29 0m Bα − > . Therefore: 
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1 2 1 2
2 2
2 1
2 2
9 (3 ) 4 3 (3 ) 4
4(9 ) 2(9 2 )
9 (9 4 )( 3 )
2(9 )(9 2 )
d c
m c B B c m c B B c
p p
m B m B
m m B B c
m B m B
α α
α α
α α
α α
∗ ∗ + + + +− = −
− −
− −
=
− −
 
Then, we find that when 29 4 0m Bα − > , d cp p
∗ ∗> , while when 29 4 0m Bα − < , 
2 22 9 4B m Bα< <  and d cp p
∗ ∗< . 
3) Using the sum of the retailer’s profit (Eq. [9]) and the supplier’s profit (Eq. [10]), 
we can determine the total profit of the decentralized FPSC. 
2
1 2
1 1 2
2
( 3 ) (27 2 )
( , ) ( , )=
16(9 )
r d d s d d
Tm B c m B
p p
m B
δ α α
π τ π τ
α
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − −+
−
, ( , )c c cpπ τ
∗ ∗ ∗  is the total profit 
of the centralized FPSC. Therefore, 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2 2
( , ) 4(9 ) 324 72 4
= 1
( , ) ( , ) (9 2 )(27 2 ) 243 72 4
c c c
r d d s d d
p m B m mB B
p p m B m B m mB B
π τ α α α
π τ π τ α α α α
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
− − +
= >
+ − − − +
, 
giving us: 
1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )r d d s d d c c cp p pπ τ π τ π τ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+ < . 
Proposition 1 indicates that the total profit of a decentralized FPSC is less than that 
of a centralized FPSC. The optimal fresh-keeping effort in a decentralized supply 
chain is lower than that in a centralized supply chain. This suggests that, in a 
decentralized FPSC, the total profit is not optimal due to the double marginal effect of 
supply chain. Therefore, it is necessary to design proper contracts to coordinate FPSC. 
We highlight that a decision to centralize may achieve maximum profit. In the 
following sections, we take cπ  as a target for a decentralized supply chain, serving 
as the motivation behind the supplier-retailer contract, that is, both retailer and 
supplier intend to achieve individual maximised profit whilst also maximised total 
profit in the supply chain.  
4 Contracting to facilitate coordination 
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In this section, we first examine whether the fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract is 
effective or not. Then, we investigate the best way to coordinate the FPSC by sharing 
both costs and revenues in fresh-keeping contracts. It is expected that the FPSC will 
be more effective if it is bonded by a contract. It is also understandable that parties 
will accept such a contract only when they do not need to scarify their own profit 
(compared to situations with no contract). 
4.1 Fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract 
From Proposition 1, we know that 
d cτ τ
∗ ∗< . Therefore, to achieve the optimal 
fresh-keeping effort 
cτ
∗  in the decentralized supply chain, a retailer must pay a 
higher fresh-keeping cost; however, the supplier may not have enough motivation to 
do this. Thus, it is necessary to design a cost-sharing contract to coordinate both 
parties.  
A cost-sharing contract typically includes two parameters. The first is the wholesale 
price 2w , which the retailer pays. The second is the cost-sharing coefficient of the 
supplier, represented by 1ϕ ( 10 1ϕ< < ). 
  According to the above description, we know that the profit function of retailer is 
        
2 2 1
1
22
2 0 0 1
0
( ) (1 ) ( )
1
( ) (1 ( (1 ) ( ) )) (1 )
2
r d d
T
d d d d
p w Q c
t
p w p k dt m
T
π ϕ τ
δ α β θ τ η ϕ τ
= − − −
= − − + − − − −∫
     
(11) 
The profit function of the supplier is 
          
2 2 1
1
22
2 0 0 1
0
( ) ( )
1
( ) (1 ( (1 ) ( ) ))
2
s d
T
d d d
w c Q c
t
w c p k dt m
T
π ϕ τ
δ α β θ τ η ϕ τ
= − −
= − − + − − −∫
         
(12) 
  Based on the above, we can derive Theorem 3. 
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Theorem 3 Under the fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract, for any given 
fresh-keeping cost sharing coefficient 1ϕ , the optimal retail price is 
1 1 2
1 2
9 (1 )( 3 ) 4
4(9(1 ) )
d
m B c B c
p
m B
ϕ α
ϕ α
∗ − + +=
− −
, and the optimal fresh-keeping effort is 
0 1
1 2
( 3 )
2(9(1 ) )
d
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
ϕ α
∗ −=
− −
. 
Proof. 
Taking the second derivative of Eq. (11) with respect to dp  and dτ , we get 
2
2
2
2 0r
d
T
p
π
δα
∂
= − <
∂
, 
2
2
12
(1 ) 0r
d
m
π
ϕ
τ
∂
= − − <
∂
. The Hessian matrix is 
0
0
1
2
2
3
2
(1 )
3
T k
T
H
T k
m
η β δ
αδ
η β δ
ϕ
 − 
=  
 − −  
. This shows that the Hessian matrix of 2rπ  is a 
negative definite for all values of dp  and dτ  if 
20
1
2
2 (1 ) ( ) 0
3
T k
Tm
η β δ
αδ ϕ− − > . 
Therefore, we find that, if 2rπ is concave in dp  and dτ , the optimal solution exists.  
Similarly, taking the second derivative of Eq. (12) with respect to 2w , we get 
2
2
2
2
0s T
w
π
δα
∂
= − <
∂
. Here, if 2sπ is concave in 2w , the optimal solution also exists. 
Hence, by solving 2
2
0s
w
π∂
=
∂
 first, then substitute 2w  into
 
2 0r
dp
π∂
=
∂
, 2 0r
d
π
τ
∂
=
∂
, we 
can develop the fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract. For any given fresh-keeping 
cost-sharing coefficient 1ϕ , the optimal retail price of the fresh product retailer is 
1 1 2
1 2
9 (1 )( 3 ) 4
4(9(1 ) )
d
m B c B c
p
m B
ϕ α
ϕ α
∗ − + +=
− −
 and the optimal fresh-keeping effort is 
0 1
1 2
( 3 )
2(9(1 ) )
d
T k B c
m B
δβ η α
τ
ϕ α
∗ −=
− −
. 
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Theorem 3 gives the optimal retail price and fresh-keeping effort for FPSC. 
Substituting 
dp
∗  and 
dτ
∗  into Eq. (11) and (12), we derive the optimal profit for both 
retailer and supplier respectively. 
                  
2 2
1 2 1
2 2
1 2
(9(1 ) 2 )( 3 )
16(9(1 ) )
r
Tm m B B c
m B
δ ϕ α α
π
ϕ α
∗ − − −=
− −
                 
(13) 
                 
2 2
1 1 2 1
2 2
1 2
(9(1 ) )( 3 )
8(9(1 ) )
s
Tm m B B c
m B
δ ϕ α ϕ α
π
ϕ α
∗ − − −=
− −
.                 
(14) 
In the cost sharing contract, the retailer has significant motivation to engage in 
fresh-keeping effort because part of cost is supposedly shared by the supplier. Let the 
optimal fresh-keeping effort is the same as in the centralized supply chain i.e.,
d cτ τ
∗ ∗= . 
By comparing the optimal decisions under the fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract for 
the scenario of a centralized decision without a contract, we derive Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2  
When 
d cτ τ
∗ ∗= ,  1) d cp p
∗ ∗> ; 2) 2 2+r s cπ π π
∗ ∗ ∗< . 
Proof. 
1) From 0 1 0 1
2 2
( 3 ) ( 3 )
2(9(1 0.5) ) 9 2
d c
T k B c T k B c
m B m B
δβ η α δβ η α
τ τ
α α
∗ ∗− −= = =
− − −
, we get 1=0.5ϕ . 
Therefore, 1 2 1 2
2 2
9 (1 0.5)( 3 ) 4 3 (3 ) 4
4(9(1 0.5) ) 2(9 2 )
d c
m B c B c m c B B c
p p
m B m B
α α
α α
∗ ∗− + + + += > =
− − −
. Hence, 
d cp p
∗ ∗> . 
2) Then, we can derive the total profit: 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
1 2
2
2
(9(1 0.5) 2 )( 3 ) (9(1 0.5) 0.5 )( 3 )
+ +
16(9(1 0.5) ) 8(9(1 0.5) )
( 3 ) (6.75 3 )
=
16(4.5 )
r s
Tm m B B c Tm m B B c
m B m B
Tm B c m B
m B
δ α α δ α α
π π
α α
δ α α
α
∗ ∗ − − − − − −=
− − − −
− −
−
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Therefore, 
2 2
1c
r s
π
π π
∗
∗ ∗
>
+
. Hence, 
2 2+r s cπ π π
∗ ∗ ∗< . 
  Proposition 2 shows that the retail price under the fresh-keeping cost-sharing 
contract is higher than that in a centralized supply chain, and the total profit is lower 
than that without a contract. Therefore, it is useful for retailer to improve their 
fresh-keeping effort through fresh-keeping cost-sharing contracts; however, the FPSC 
cannot be coordinated under fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract. Thus, we must 
consider how to maximize profits by adding a revenue-sharing contract. 
4.2 Fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract 
To achieve the optimal retail price and the same fresh-keeping effort as well as total 
profit as in the centralized supply chain, we consider a case in which a supplier offers 
a discount to a retailer (apart from sharing the fresh-keeping cost). In such a case, the 
retailer may be willing to reduce the price due to the lower procurement price, and it 
may also be willing to share some revenue with the supplier.  
Fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contracts include three parameters. The 
first is the wholesale price 3w  that the retailer pays. The second is the cost share 
coefficient of the supplier, represented by 1ϕ ( 10 1ϕ< < ). The third is the revenue 
share coefficient of supplier, represented by 2ϕ ( 20 1ϕ< < ). 
According to the above descriptions, we know that the profit function of the retailer 
is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
3 2 3 3 1
1
2
2
2 3 0 0 1
0
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
2
r d d
T
d d d d
p Q w Q c
t
p w p k dt m
T
π ϕ ϕ τ
ϕ δ α β θ τ η ϕ τ
= − − − −
  
   = − − − + − − − −       
∫
  (15) 
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Then, the profit function of the supplier is: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 21
0
2
1
0023
1323
2
1
11 d
T
ddd
ddds
mdt
T
t
kppcw
cQcwQp
τϕητθβαδϕ
τϕϕπ
−























−−+−+−=
−−+=
∫
   (16)
     
 
Based on the above, we can derive Theorem 4. 
Theorem 4 Under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract, for any given 
wholesale price 3w , fresh-keeping cost-sharing coefficient 1ϕ and revenue-sharing 
coefficient 2ϕ , the optimal retail price of a fresh product retailer is 
2 0 2 0 3
2
3(1 )( 1) 2(1 ) (1 ) 3
( )
6(1 )
d
d d
k w
p
ϕ βθ ϕ βη τ α
τ
ϕ α
∗ ∗ − + − − − +=
−
 and the optimal 
fresh-keeping effort is 2 3 0
1
2((1 ) )
( )
3(1 )
d
d d
p w T k
p
m
ϕ βη δ
τ
ϕ
∗
∗ ∗ − −=
−
. 
Proof. 
Taking the second derivative of Eq. (15) with respect to dp  and dτ , we have 
2
3
12
(1 ) 0r
d
m
π
ϕ
τ
∂
= − − <
∂
,
 
2
3
22
2(1 ) 0r
d
T
p
π
ϕ δα
∂
= − − <
∂
. The Hessian matrix is 
2 0
2
2 0
1
2(1 )
2(1 )
3
2(1 )
(1 )
3
T k
T
H
T k
m
ϕ η β δ
ϕ αδ
ϕ η β δ
ϕ
− − − 
=  
− − −  
. This shows that the Hessian matrix of 
3rπ  returns a negative definite for all values of dp  and dτ  if 
20
1
2
2 (1 ) ( ) 0
3
T k
Tm
η β δ
αδ ϕ− − > . Therefore, we find that 2rπ is concave in dp  and 
dτ , suggesting that the optimal solution exists.  
Hence, solving 3 0r
d
π
τ
∂
=
∂
 
and 3 0r
dp
π∂
=
∂
, we can derive the optimal retail price 
2 0 2 0 3
2
3(1 )( 1) 2(1 ) (1 ) 3
( )
6(1 )
d
d d
k w
p
ϕ βθ ϕ βη τ α
τ
ϕ α
∗ ∗ − + − − − +=
−
 and the optimal 
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fresh-keeping effort 2 3 0
1
2((1 ) )
( )
3(1 )
d
d d
p w T k
p
m
ϕ βη δ
τ
ϕ
∗
∗ ∗ − −=
−
. 
Let 
d cp p
∗ ∗=  and d cτ τ
∗ ∗= . It is then necessary to adjust the wholesale price 3w  to 
facilitate coordination, leading us to theorem 5. 
Theorem 5 If the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract 1 2 3( , , )wϕ ϕ  is 
satisfied by 1 2=ϕ ϕ , 3 2(1 )w cϕ= −  and 
2
2 2
22 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
1
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
ϕ
α α
− −
≤ ≤ −
− −
, 
then 
3 3r s cπ π π
∗ ∗ ∗+ =  is achieved, and the FPSC can be coordinated. 
Proof. 
Let =d cp p
∗ ∗ ; that is 3
22(1 ) 2
w c
ϕ
=
−
. Thus, we obtain 3 2(1 )w c ϕ= − . 
Similarly, let
 
=d cτ τ
∗ ∗ ; thus, we obtain 2 3
1
(1 )
1
d
c
p w
p c
ϕ
ϕ
∗
∗− − = −
−
. That is, 
2 1(1 )( ) (1 )( )d cp c p cϕ ϕ
∗ ∗− − = − − ; therefore, 1 2=ϕ ϕ .  
Substituting 1 2=ϕ ϕ , 3 2(1 )w c ϕ= −  and cp
∗  and 
cτ
∗  into Eq. (15) and Eq. (16), 
we derive the optimal total profit of the retailer as follows: 
                          
2
2 1
3
2
(1 ) ( 3 )
4(9 2 )
r
Tm B c
m B
ϕ δ α
π
α
∗ − −=
−
                   (17) 
The optimal total profit of supplier is:
  
                           
2
2 1
3
2
( 3 )
4(9 2 )
s
Tm B c
m B
ϕ δ α
π
α
∗ −=
−
                        
 (18) 
Comparing Eq. (17) and Eq. (18) with Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), we get 
2
2 2
22 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
1
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
ϕ
α α
− −
≤ ≤ −
− −
. 
Then, the total profit under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract is: 
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2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1
3 3 3
2 2 2
(1 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 )
+ =
4(9 2 ) 4(9 2 ) 4(9 2 )
r s
Tm B c Tm B c Tm B c
m B m B m B
ϕ δ α ϕ δ α δ α
π π π
α α α
∗ ∗ ∗ − − − −= + =
− − −
 (19) 
It is equal to the total profit 
cπ
∗
 
in the centralized FPSC. Thus, 
3 3r s cπ π π
∗ ∗ ∗+ = , and 
the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract makes sense. 
Comparing the retailer’s profit under cost- and revenue- sharing contract with the 
case in decentralized FPSC, we get 
2 2
1 1 2 1
3 1 2
2 2
2 1 2
1 2
2 2
(1 ) ( 3 ) (9 2 )( 3 )
4(9 2 ) 16(9 )
(1 ) (9 2 )
= ( 3 )
4(9 2 ) 16(9 )
r r
Tm B c Tm m B B c
m B m B
m B
Tm B c
m B m B
ϕ δ α δ α α
π π
α α
ϕ α
δ α
α α
∗ ∗ − − − −− = −
− −
 − −
− − − − 
 
Because of 
2
2 2
1 2 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
, 1
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
ϕ
α α
 − −
∈ − − − 
, 
2
2
1 2
2
(9 2 )
1
4(9 )
m B
m B
α
ϕ
α
−
− ≥
−
. 
Therefore, 
3 1 0r rπ π
∗ ∗− ≥ . That is the retailer under cost- and revenue- sharing contract 
can earn more profit than the case in decentralized FPSC. 
Similarly, 
2 2
2 1 1
3 1 2
2 2
( 3 ) 9 ( 3 )
4(9 2 ) 8(9 )
s s
Tm B c Tm B c
m B m B
ϕ δ α αδ α
π π
α α
∗ ∗ − −− = −
− −
 
2 2
1 2
2 2
9
= ( 3 )
4(9 2 ) 8(9 )
Tm B c
m B m B
ϕ α
δ α
α α
 
− − − − 
 
Because of 
2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
, 1
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
ϕ
α α
 − −
∈ − − − 
, 22 2
2
9 (9 2 )
2(9 )
m m B
m B
α α
ϕ
α
−
≥
−
. 
Hence, 
3 1 0s sπ π
∗ ∗− ≥ . That is the supplier under cost- and revenue- sharing contract 
can earn more profit than the case in decentralized FPSC. 
Theorem 5 indicates that when the cost-sharing coefficient 1ϕ  is equal to the 
revenue-sharing coefficient 2ϕ , and they are all in the range of 
2
2 2
2 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
, 1
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
α α
 − −
− − − 
, the FPSC can be coordinated by the 
fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract and that a win-win situation between 
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the fresh product retailer and supplier can be achieved. A comparison of the FPSC 
profits shows that all parties incur higher profits in the cost- and revenue-sharing 
contract in comparison to the decentralized case. Consequently, the retailer and the 
supplier have enough motivation to accept cost- and revenue- sharing contract. 
We now discuss how the cost- and revenue- sharing contract can be implemented in 
practice. 
The supplier and the retailer first agree on cost- and revenue- sharing contract 
1 2 3( , , )wϕ ϕ , the supplier can observe the optimal retail price and the optimal 
fresh-keeping effort which determined by retailer. As for Q , the supplier can conduct 
a check of the ordering quantity when the contract is reached. The wholesale price can 
then be determined by 3 2(1 )w cϕ= − . According to the contract, the fresh-keeping 
cost sharing proportion of supplier is 1ϕ , the retailer’s proportion is 1(1 )ϕ− ; the 
revenue sharing proportion of supplier is 2ϕ , the retailer’s proportion is 2(1 )ϕ− ; 
where 1 2=ϕ ϕ , they are in the range of 
2
2 2
2 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
, 1
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
α α
 − −
− − − 
. 
Corollary 1 Under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract 1 2 3( , , )wϕ ϕ , 
if consumers’ sensitivity to the price of product α  is greater, the FPSC will be 
difficult to coordinate. However if consumers’ sensitivity to the freshness of product 
β  is greater, the FPSC will be easy to coordinate. 
Proof. 
According to Theorem 5 
2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
9 (9 2 ) (9 2 )
[ ,1 ]
2(9 ) 4(9 )
m m B m B
m B m B
α α α
ϕ
α α
− −
∈ −
− −
 
, denoting as 
2 2 2[ , ]min maxϕ ϕ ϕ∈ . Taking the first derivative of 2minϕ  with respect to α , we get 
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2
2 2
3
2
9
0
(9 )
min mB
m B
ϕ
α α
∂
= >
∂ −
; that is, 2minϕ  is positively related to α . Taking the first 
derivative of 2maxϕ  with respect to α , we get 2 2 23
2
9(9 2 )
0
2(9 )
max m B mB
m B
ϕ α
α α
∂ −
= − <
∂ −
; 
that is 2maxϕ  is negatively correlated to α . Therefore, the range of 2ϕ  is decreasing 
with an increasing α  when 2 2 2[ , ]min maxϕ ϕ ϕ∈ . In other words, the revenue-sharing 
coefficient of the fresh product supplier is negatively correlated with consumers’ 
sensitivity to price, making the supplier unwilling to accept the contract and the FPSC 
difficult to coordinate. 
  Similarly, 
2
2 2
3
2
18
0
(9 )
min mB
m B
ϕ α
β β α
∂
= − <
∂ −
, 2 2 2
3
2
9 (9 2 )
0
(9 )
max m m B B
m B
ϕ α α
β β α
∂ −
= >
∂ −
. 
Therefore, the range of 2ϕ  is increasing with the increasing β  when
2 2 2[ , ]min maxϕ ϕ ϕ∈ . In other words, the revenue-sharing coefficient of the fresh product 
supplier is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness, making the 
supplier willing to accept the contract and the FPSC easy to coordinate. 
From Theorem 5 and Corollary 1, we know that it is necessary to choose the proper 
conditions when negotiating a contract. The total FPSC profit is positively related 
with consumers’ sensitivity to product price and negatively correlated with consumers’ 
sensitivity to product freshness.  
5 Numerical analysis 
In the above sections, we theoretically discuss how to coordinate the FPSC under a 
contract situation and a non-contract contract situation and then explore the 
differences between the centralized FPSC and the decentralized FPSC. To illustrate 
the theoretical results, we present some numerical examples in this section. The 
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parameters are summarized in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 Parameters 
Using the parameters in Table 1, we apply them into previously analysed scenarios.    
Insert Figure 3 Optimal decisions under different preferences without a contract 
The results in Figure 3 verify Theorems 1 and 2 and Proposition 1. They show the 
optimal retail price and the optimal fresh-keeping effort between the centralized FPSC 
and the decentralized FPSC. Figure 3.1 & 3.4 indicate that the optimal fresh-keeping 
effort in a centralized supply chain is higher than that in a decentralized supply chain. 
Figure 3.2 & 3.5 illustrate that that the optimal retail price in a centralized supply 
chain is lower than that in a decentralized supply chain. Figure 3.3 & 3.6 demonstrate 
that the optimal total profit in a centralized supply chain is greater than that in a 
decentralized supply chain. In sum, the optimal decisions in the centralized FPSC are 
better than those in the decentralized FPSC. 
Insert Figure 4 Optimal decisions and profits under the fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract 
From Figure 4, we can see that the optimal fresh-keeping effort under the 
fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract is the same as that found in the centralized FPSC 
(Figure 4.1 & 4.4). However, the retailer price is higher than that in the centralized 
FPSC (Figure 4.2 & 4.5); and the total profit is lower (Figure 4.3 & 4.6). Therefore, 
the FPSC cannot be coordinated via a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract. 
Insert Figure 5 Optimal decisions and profits under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract 
Figure 5 reveals the optimal decisions and profits under the fresh-keeping cost- and 
revenue-sharing contract. These findings confirm Theorems 4 and 5. By comparing 
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the results in Figure 3.1 & 3.4 with Figure 5.1 & 5.4, and Figure 3.2 & 3.5 with 
Figure 5.2 & 5.5, it becomes clear that the optimal fresh-keeping effort and retail 
price under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract achieve the level of 
the centralized FPSC; the individual profit is higher than those in other two scenarios. 
Moreover, from Figure 5.3 & 5.6, it can be seen that the total profit is the same as that 
in the centralized supply chain. 
Insert Figure 6. The effects of consumers’ sensitivity to price and freshness on profit 
Based on Corollary 1, we can illustrate the effects of consumers’ sensitivity to price 
and freshness on profit, which is depicted in Figure 6. We know that the optimal profit 
that under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract achieve the level of 
the centralized FPSC. From Figure 6, it is clear that the FPSC profit increases with the 
increasing of consumers’ sensitivity to product freshness, and it decreases with the 
increasing of consumers’ sensitivity to product price. 
 Our analysis thus reveals that from the product’s fresh-keeping perspective, cost- and 
revenue- sharing contract offered by the retailer or obtained through negotiation leads 
to a higher fresh-keeping effort in FPSC, brings more profit to both supplier and 
retailer. The results explain the reason why supplier and retailer would prefer cost- 
and revenue- sharing contract under fresh-keeping effort, and would cooperate with 
supply chain partners in order to benefit from the fresh-keeping initiatives. 
6 Conclusion and future research 
One of the specific challenges in food supply chain is that freshness of food is one 
of the keys for customers purchasing decision. This leads to two important questions: 
first, how much effort and resources are needed among FPSC members in order to 
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keep the product refresh. Second, how to motivate and coordinate PFSC members 
through contract mechanism. This paper strives to answer these questions.  
In this paper, we have examined the coordination of FPSC with a fresh-keeping 
effort. We focus on the coordination of the FPSC through different contracts when the 
fresh-keeping effort is considered in the model. Two cases are considered: a 
fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing 
contract. In each case, we determine the optimal retail price, the optimal wholesale 
price and the optimal fresh-keeping effort. The result suggests that the fresh-keeping 
cost- and revenue-sharing contract is more effective for coordinating the FPSC. 
We find that, in negotiating the contract, it is necessary to carefully consider the 
conditions to maximize total profit without scarifying individual profit. It is worth 
noting that the profit of the FPSC is negatively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity 
to product price, while it is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to product 
freshness. 
There are several topics that merit further research. In this paper, we assume that 
the fresh-keeping cost is paid by the fresh product retailer in a centralized supply 
chain. A natural extension is to examine a setting in which the fresh-keeping cost is 
paid by the fresh product supplier. Since, in this research, the consumer arrival rate at 
any time is assumed to be constant, another interesting possibility is to examine a 
situation in which the rate is stochastic. Finally, we will extend our model to consider 
how to coordinate the FPSC through cost- and revenue-sharing contracts when two 
retailers compete by studying the coordination mechanisms of the FPSC when one 
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retailer has the priority to make its decision first. 
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Table 1 Parameters 
k  m  c  δ  T  0θ  0η  
0.20 100 0.50 100 10 0.90 0.80 
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Figure 1 Research Framework for a FPSC 
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Figure 2 Relationships of Events under Consideration 
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Figure 3.1 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on fresh-keeping effort 
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Figure 3 Optimal decisions under different preferences without a contract 
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Figure 4.1 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on fresh-keeping effort 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on retail price 
 
 
Figure 4.3 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on profit 
 
 
Figure 4.4 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to freshness on fresh-keeping 
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Figure 4.5 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to freshness on retail price 
 
 
Figure 4.6 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to freshness on profit 
 
Figure 4 Optimal decisions and profits under the fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract 
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Figure 5.1 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on fresh-keeping effort 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on retail price 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to price on profit 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to freshness on fresh-keeping 
effort 
 
Figure 5.5 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to freshness on retail price 
 
 
Figure 5.6 The effect of consumers’ 
sensitivity to freshness on profit 
 
Figure 5 Optimal decisions and profits under the fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing 
contract 
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Figure 6 The effects of consumers’ sensitivity to price and freshness on profit 
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